Introduction
In recent decades there has been a surge of economic literature on monetary policy transmission mechanisms. The most traditional view is characterised by the interest rate channel. Expansionary (contractionary) monetary policy lowers (raises) money market interest rates, thereby reducing (increasing) borrowing costs and boosting (reducing) loan demand, investments and consumption.
Moreover, theory offers several other transmission channels, including the exchange rate, asset price and credit channels. The credit channel, formalised by Bernanke and Blinder (1988) , can be further decomposed into the asset price and bank lending channels. The bank lending channel, which includes an important role for banks in the transmission process, is of special interest in this study.
In the context of a bank lending channel, a tightening (loosening) of monetary policy causes a contraction (expansion) in banks' loan supply. The underlying assumption is that when faced with a decrease in liquidity, banks reduce the loan supply. There is ample evidence that aggregate bank lending decreases after a tightening of monetary policy. This, however, could as well be caused by a contraction in loan demand (via the interest rate channel) as by a contraction in loan supply (bank lending channel). To sort out the changes in loan supply from changes in loan demand, the literature has focused on cross-sectional differences between banks. It is usually assumed that, after a monetary tightening, all banks experience a decrease in liquid core deposits and a receding demand for bank loans. Some banks may find it difficult to compensate for the loss of loanable funds and hence contract the loan supply. This contraction amplifies the transmission of monetary policy into the real economy.
The increased availability of large micro-level data sets has facilitated the growth in empirical literature focusing on these issues. Largely due to data availability, the studies have mainly focused on the US and EU economies. Most studies on euro area economies do find that a bank lending channel exists, whereas the studies on the US provide a more mixed set of results. 1 The evidence from emerging countries where the banking sectors are still in the making is so far fairly 1 See Ehrmann et al (2003) and Gambacorta (2005) and the references therein for a summary of studies on the euro area. Kishan and Opiela (2000) , Kashyap and Stein (2000) for the US case.
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The role of banks in monetary policy transmission: Empirical evidence from Russia 6 patchy and fragmented. 2 There are, however, good reasons to assume that bank lending may indeed be an influential channel of monetary policy transmission especially in these economies.
As evidenced by the various studies on the euro area countries (Ehrmann et al, 2003) , the structure of the banking sector may greatly influence the effectiveness of the bank lending channel.
For the contraction in bank loan supply to be transmitted into the real economy, it is necessary that some firms be unable to substitute other forms of external finance for bank credit. Therefore, banks' lending behaviour is likely to transmit monetary policy changes into the real economy more readily in economies with bank-based financial systems. Most European (developed as well as emerging)
economies rely much more heavily on bank finance than does the US. Comparing the ratio of total banking sector assets to GDP in a number of European countries and the US reveals that banks are much more important in Europe. Consequently, bank loans play a much more important in corporate finance in Europe, whereas in the US the stock and bond markets are considerably more important.
In an emerging economy like Russia, bank loans are typically short-term and hence may speed up the transmission process. Moreover, informational frictions between individual banks are likely to be more pronounced in a banking system characterised by a large number of small banks, relatively frequent bank failures, short credit histories, and slowly improving regulation. We therefore feel that examining the role of banks in monetary policy transmission in Russia should be especially fruitful.
Following the tradition of Kashyap and Stein (1995) and Ehrmann et al (2003) , we rely on cross-sectional differences in micro-level data on the Russian banking sector to examine whether the bank loan supply is affected by changes in domestic monetary policy.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section describes the monetary policy framework in Russia and discusses the possible transmission channels. Further, some systemic features of the Russian banking sector are examined in the light of the previous literature. Section three describes the data and estimation methodology used in the analysis. Section four presents our empirical evidence on the existence of a bank lending channel in Russia, and the last section concludes.
2
The structure of the banking system and monetary policy transmission in Russia
Monetary policy
The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) has for several years aimed at a dual target of stable nominal exchange rate and low inflation. Since 1998, the de facto target has been the exchange rate, most recently vis-à-vis a currency basket composed of the US dollar and the euro. In its annual Guidelines for the Single State Monetary Policy, the CBR has specified the inflation target and forecast range for growth of the rouble money stock (M2).
The CBR's set of monetary policy tools has been fairly restricted, and M2 growth has served as an information tool. The role of CBR interest rates is limited at best. With few sterilization tools, there has been an apparent tradeoff between controlling rising inflation and limiting the pace of nominal rouble appreciation. 
Banking sector
Economic growth at record high levels for several consecutive years, high export incomes, budget surpluses, structural reforms in the early 2000s, and further development of the international capital markets have contributed to the rapid growth of the Russian banking sector. For many years now, credit has grown on average by 50% per year and deposits by 40%.
Despite increasing demand for banking services due to robust economic growth, a relatively small number of Russian banks are "real" banks, whose main income source is intermediation of deposits into loans. The overall extent of financial intermediation is still low, as most investments are financed from firm's internal sources. Bank financing accounts for just 10% of corporate sector fixed investments. As of end-2007, bank assets amounted to 61% of GDP, household deposits 16% and credit to the private sector 37%. Although corporate borrowing has increased rapidly, Russian companies have been forced to borrow abroad, as the domestic banking sector has not been able to meet the demand for long-term financing driven by strong economic growth. Due to legacies from the privatization of (large) banks following the Soviet era, the financial crisis of 1998, restrictions on foreign banks' participation, and a lack of domestic competition; Russian banking is now characterized by a combination of a large number of banks (1125 at mid-2008) and
The role of banks in monetary policy transmission: Empirical evidence from Russia a heavy concentration of assets in a few state-controlled ones. Sberbank, VTB (Vneshtorgbank) and
Gazprombank accounted for almost 40% of total assets and the next largest 200 banks for about 50% of total assets in the sector. Sberbank held 50% of deposits alone, and was the 33 rd biggest bank in the world according to The Banker. Currently, however, most private banks are de novo banks, and most public banks were created after the collapse of the Soviet Union, by various government bodies.
Foreign bank entrance to the market has been limited, though in recent years Russian banks have diversified into retail banking while Small and Medium Enterprises have improved their governance in order to attract international funding. As a result, international institutions have acquired in particular banks with developed retail networks, as a means of entering the market.
Branches of foreign banks are so far not allowed. About a quarter of the total bank assets are in foreign hands.
The capital adequacy ratios of Russian banks have been affected by the rapid credit expansion, though they are still at reasonable levels. The smaller banks have continued to experience difficulties in attracting equity investments, and even the larger ones have revised their funding plans due to global liquidity conditions. The generally low level of confidence between the banks adds to the vulnerability of the sector's liquidity, and the interbank market does not distribute liquidity efficiently. Small banks are often shut out from access to finance.
Turning to the questions specific to our analysis of the bank lending channel in Russia, and arising from the structure of the banking sector, large banks may buffer their credit supply from monetary policy shocks. In their study of the relationship between banking competition and the transmission of monetary policy through the bank lending channel, Adams and Amel (2005) find that the impact of monetary policy on loan originations is weaker in more concentrated markets.
Furthermore, according to Ehrmann et al (2003) , one can argue that the existence of "house banks" in several European countries, most notably Germany, may at least mute the reaction of bank loan supply to monetary policy. Thus the Russian "pocket banks", which serve non-banks only within a particular business grouping, would presumably also reduce the effectiveness of monetary policy.
In general, one of the main problems of the Russian banking sector seems to be the lack of competition and the related lack of restructuring. Karas et al (2008) show that both foreign banks and domestic public banks are more efficient than domestic private banks, indicating that the Russian banking system may benefit more from increased levels of competition and greater access for foreign banks than from bank privatization.
Finally, due to the structural problems of the sector and mistrust in the interbank market there has thus far been a reluctance to let even small banks go bankrupt, because in the present rumour-sensitive environment this may be enough to cause problems for the entire sector or even bank runs.
3
The model and identification of the lending channel
The main argument for the lending channel of monetary policy transmission, as formalised by Bernanke and Blinder (1988) , is that changes in monetary policy affect the amount of deposits (money) available to banks. The lending channel arises because some banks find it difficult to offset changes in the level of deposits except by adjusting their loan supply.
Typically, we would assume that in equilibrium money demand D equals money supply M and that money demand depends on monetary policy:
Loan demand depends on real DGP (y), price level (p) and the loan interest rate (r):
The supply of loans depends directly on the amount of loanable funds (deposits or money) D available, the loan interest rate r and the monetary policy stance (mp):
Monetary policy, typically approximated by a central bank's policy interest rate, enters the loan supply function both directly and indirectly. First, the direct link is the opportunity cost for a bank that uses interbank markets to finance loans. Secondly, the amount of deposits (or money) available depends negatively on the policy interest rate. Following Ehrmann et al (2001) , we further assume that banks are not equally dependent on deposit finance. The impact of deposits on loan supply depends on bank characteristics X i (size, capitalization liquidity):
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Assuming that the loan market clears and using the equations above, loan supply can be written as
The coefficient c 1 combines the loan-supply effects of monetary policy and individual-bank characteristics. In this framework a significant coefficient c 1 would imply the existence of a bank lending channel, i.e. that monetary policy affects bank loan supply.
The underlying assumption in the literature is that all banks face identical loan demand. This implies, inter alia, that loan demand does not depend on bank characteristics. If e.g. customers of small banks typically reduce their loan demand more than customers of large banks, when faced with an interest rate hike, identification of bank lending behaviour becomes impossible. The assumption of homogeneous loan demand is thus crucial. As most firms, large or small, have no short-term alternative to bank loan financing, this is usually taken as a fairly reasonable benchmark.
Our empirical model is based on (4) In the second specification the macro-variables and trend are replaced by a compete set of time dummies. In the third specification we exclude the macro-variables also from the interaction terms. Thus, following Gambacorta (2005) , we allow the coefficients of bank-specific variables to vary with monetary policy and with time but not with macroeconomic fluctuations.
In all of these specifications, the existence of a bank lending channel should be reflected in a significant coefficient for the interaction of the bank characteristics with the particular monetary policy indicator. The three measures of bank characteristics found in the literature are bank size, capitalization and liquidity. Bank size and its capitalization and liquidity ratios are measures that may influence a bank's access to and premium on external finance. High levels of liquidity may also allow a bank to draw on own liquid funds instead of going to the market after a monetary tightening. Following the literature, we define bank characteristics as
Size is measured as log of total assets in nominal roubles. Liquidity is the share of liquid assets in total assets. Liquid assets are bank reserves + loans to banks + securities. Capitalization is the bank's own-capital-to-total assets ratio. All these variables are normalised with respect to their sample means. The size variable is normalised, not over the whole period, but with respect to the sample average of each period, in order to remove the constantly increasing trends in size.
The preceding literature offers little guidance as to the choice of monetary policy variable.
The studies based on US data frequently use the Fed Funds rate, usually complemented with one or two indicator variables based on Federal Reserve statements (Romer dates or Boshen-Mills indicators). The studies on European economies and emerging countries rely on central bank repo rates or short-term money market interest rates, irrespective whether the countries target inflation.
The challenge in analysing Russian monetary policy is that the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) uses several operations to adjust banking sector liquidity, and consequently there is no single interest rate that could be self-evidently used as the monetary policy target rate. During the period analysed here, the financial markets were extremely liquid, and therefore CBR operations have aimed mainly at tightening liquidity. However, as the interbank market in Russia functions poorly, the CBR has occasionally injected liquidity even in times of extreme overall liquidity. Russian fi- The mulitiplicity of CBR market operations is at least partly explained by the highly fragmented structure of the banking sector. Some banks are very narrowly focused, serving only a certain group of enterprises or a given region, and hence the types of collateral vary.
Therefore it should not come as a surprise that the Central Bank's interest rates have historically had very limited effects on interbank market rates and thereby on the cost of loanable funds. Another possibility to proxy CBR's monetary policy stance is to use the fluctuations in money stocks. As discussed earlier, Russian monetary policy has a dual objective of stable exchange rate and moderate inflation. As an intermediate target, the CBR officially targets growth rate of monetary aggregates, especially the broad money M2. It is highly questionable how much control the central bank has on M2 (see Vymyatnina, 2006 ) and therefore we also use the monetary base M0 in the regressions. The monetary base includes cash in circulation, commercial-bank deposits and required reserves at the central bank, as well as CBR bonds held by banks. The changes in this aggregate should be much more under CBR control.
As there is no consensus on the best measure of monetary policy stance in Russia, we use four different variables. In line with much of the previous literature, we use the Russian money market rate (Moscow interbank interest rate, 3mMibor). Further, we take the most widely cited CBR policy rate, the refinancing rate, which is used e.g. in overnight operations. The interbank interest rate should reflect changes in market liquidity whereas the CBR refinancing rate has generally served as the upper bound for market interest rates. Next we use the measure that CBR reportedly targets, broad money M2. And finally we take the more narrow measure of money, the monetary base M0. Figure 1 plots these four measures in first differences. As expected, the money measures move together, but the two interest rate variables are not highly correlated with each other. 
BOFIT-Institute for Economies in Transition

Data
The database we use is a quarterly panel of balance sheet data for all Russian banks from the first quarter of 1999 to the first quarter of 2007 (end-of-period data). For a detailed description of the dataset and the cleaning procedures, see Karas-Schoors (2005) . Table 4 The Russian data confirm the pattern found elsewhere (see Kashyap and Stein 2000 for the US):
small banks hold larger buffer stocks and make fewer loans. The underlying reason is that small banks have more trouble in securing external financing due to informational frictions and e.g. very limited access to Russian interbank markets.
Empirical evidence on bank lending channel in Russia
To assess the role of banks in monetary transmission we estimated the model in equation (5). As the model is dynamic in the sense that the right-hand side includes lagged dependent variables, the standard OLS would produce inconsistent estimates. Therefore we use the generalised method of moments (GMM) suggested by Blundell-Bond (1988) to obtain consistent and efficient estimators.
The GMM estimator first-differences the equation in order to remove individual-bank effects and produces an equation that is estimable by instrument variables. The model is estimated with one lag of the dependent variable, contemporaneous and one lag for all other variables. Loan growth is instrumented with the second to sixth lags of the endogenous variable.
The key results are reported in table 5. Each column presents the results using one of the four monetary policy indicators. We report the estimated long-run coefficients only. The columns (3) and (4) Concentrating on the first two columns, we find evidence of monetary policy affecting bank loan supply. An increase in a monetary aggregate (reflecting monetary policy expansion) increases bank lending, but less so for well capitalized banks. Contrary to most studies on the US or euro area, bank liquidity and bank size are not significant in explaining bank lending. We note, however, that capitalization and bank size are negatively correlated. As seen from the Table x, well-capitalized banks tend to be very small as measured by total assets. 
Some robustness checks
The approach is based on the assumption that the macroeconomic variables included in the model can capture the relevant time effects. Following Ehremann et al (2001), we check for the robustness of our results with the alternative specification reported in Table 6 below. In the alternative model, all macroeconomic variables are replaced by a full set of time dummies. The model is estimated with one lag of the dependent variable, contemporaneous and one lag for all other variables. As a robustness check, we also estimated the model with two, three and four lags. Our main results remain unchanged and therefore the estimations are not reported (available from the authors upon request).
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In the both models the estimated coefficients of the interaction terms between monetary policy and bank characteristics are of similar magnitude. This serves as a further confirmation of our results.
Well capitalized banks consistently adjust their lending behaviour less than the other banks in the face of a monetary policy change. An easing of monetary policy increases bank lending but less so for well capitalized banks. The main results remain unchanged also when each of the bank characteristics was added one at a time to the model. Only the interaction of monetary policy with capitalization was significant.
As a further robustness check, we controlled for the structure of a bank's loan portfolio as a proxy for possible differences in bank's loan demand. In the spirit of Gambacorta (2005) , the basic model was estimated with the loans for enterprises as the dependent variable. The results remain qualitatively the same. On the contrary, the model failed to produce significant results when the changes in household loans was used as the dependent variable. This result is not too surprising.
Household loans still constitute only a tiny share of the total bank lending in Russia.
We also checked whether bank ownership matters for bank lending. We divided banks in our sample into three ownership groups: state-controlled, foreign and domestic private banks. State controlled banks are defined as in Karas et al. (2009) . The foreign ownership dummy is based on CBR data on banks with foreign ownership share exceeding 50%. One might expect that both state and foreign banks have better access to alternative funding sources via their owners. And therefore private domestic banks would react most to changes in monetary policy. Alternatively, one could assume that in Russia state controlled banks are especially inclined to follow policy guidance from the CBR and the government. Contrary to our expectations and e.g. to results by Vinhas de Souza (2006), we did not find evidence for bank ownership being significant in any of the specifications.
What matters for the bank lending channel in Russia is bank capitalization.
Conclusions
This paper investigates the role of banks in monetary policy transmission mechanism in Russia. As the stated long term goal of Russian Central Bank is to switch to inflation targeting, understanding how the banking sector reacts to changes in monetary policy stance is very important.
We On the other hand, factors like bank size and liquidity are generally not important for the way a bank reacts to monetary policy changes. We explain the absence of size and liquidity effects by the characteristics of the Russian banking sector. Size and capitalization are clearly negatively correlated whereas the poor functioning of the interbank markets drives all Russian banks to hold sizable liquidity buffers.
To sum up, the results of this paper indicate that changes in monetary policy lead banks to change their loan supply. The strength of the lending channel depends on a bank's capitalization.
Our results suggest that the well capitalized banks face smaller informational frictions and have easier access to alternative financing sources at times of monetary contraction.
